LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT Stephen F. Rohde, State Bar # 51446 1 steve@rohde-victoroff.com **ROHDE & VICTOROFF** 2 UCI 0 9 2012 VA 1880 Century Park East, Suite 411 Los Angeles, California 90067-2561 Telephone: (310) 277-1482 Facsimile: (310) 277-1485 3 4 5 Attorneys for Defendant Lynne Spears 6 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 7 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 8 9 CASE NO.: BC406904 SAM LUTFI, 10 Lynne Spears' Motion in Limine #2 11 Plaintiff. DEFENDANT LYNNE SPEARS' 12 VS. RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF SAM LYNNE IRENE SPEARS, JAMES UTFI'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 13 PARNELL SPEARS, BRITNEY JEAN ON PLEADING OF LIBELOUS MATTER, IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE # 2 TO SPEARS, and DOES 1 through 25, 14 inclusive. PRECLUDE & EXCLUDE 15 Defendants. EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY OF ALLEGED DEFAMATORY 16 STATEMENTS EXCEPT THOSE IDENTIFIED IN PLAINTIFF'S 17 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 18 Trial 19 **Date:** 10/10/2012 Time: 10:00 a.m. 20 Place: Dept. 71 21 **Action Commenced:** 2/3/2009 Final Status Conference: 9/252012 22 Jury Trial Date: 10/1/2012 23 24 25 26 27 28

LYNN SPEARS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S SUPP BRIEF RE: MOTION IN LIMINE #2

DEFENDANT LYNNE SPEARS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON PLEADING LIBELOUS MATTER

Plaintiff Sam Lutfi ("Lutfi") has filed a Supplement Brief on Pleading of Libelous Matter ("Supp. Brief") in further opposition to Defendant Lynne Spears ("Lynne")'s Motion in Limine #2. In response to Lynne's Motion in Limine #2, the Court has indicated that Plaintiff is bound by the **Previously Identified Alleged**Defamatory Statements set forth in the First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), but gave Plaintiff leave to file additional briefing to support Plaintiff's position that it can proceed to trial on the vastly expanded list of Thirty-Four (34) Alleged Defamatory Statements, which Plaintiff first identified in his [Proposed] Jury Instructions, about two-weeks ago.

1. <u>Lutfi Is Limited to the Previously Identified Alleged Defamatory</u> <u>Statements Set Forth in the FAC.</u>

Lutfi's Supp. Brief totally ignores the controlling legal authority in this situation. Under California law, "the words constituting an alleged libel must be specifically identified, if not pleaded verbatim, in the complaint." Gilbert v. Sykes, 147 Cal.App.4th 13, 34 (2007). Allegations which do not identify the substance of what was said or written are insufficient. See Silicon Knights, Inc. v. Crystal Dynamics, Inc., 983 F.Supp. 1303, 1314 (N.D.Cal.199); Jacobson v Schwarzenegger, 357 F.Supp.2d 1198, 1216 (C.D.Cal.2004).

Plaintiff does not address, let alone distinguish the Gilbert, Silicon Knights or Jacobson decisions. Instead, Plaintiff cites a truncated excerpt from Witkin. The excerpt actually supports Lynne's position, not Plaintiff's. It say that "the complaint should set the [alleged defamatory] matter out verbatim, either in the body or as an attachment." 5 Witkin, California Procedure (5th ed., 2008), Pleading, § 739. In other

words, the alleged defamatory matter should be set out either <u>verbatim in the body or</u> verbatim in an attachment.

Nothing cited by Plaintiff or in Witkin or in the cases cited therein or in any case Lynne has found would allow a plaintiff to attach a 20-page excerpt from a book and on the eve of trial claim, as Plaintiff does here, that "[a]II three chapters are about Plaintiff and they are riddled with one false statement after another," Supp. Brief 1:18-21, leaving it up the defendant to figure out what Plaintiff is alleging is false and defamatory.

Lutfi persists in making the astounding argument that despite the fact that the FAC specifically quoted only the **Previously Identified Alleged Defamatory**Statements, Lynne should have gone through the three (3) entire chapters attached to the FAC, amounting to twenty (20) pages, to "ascertain which statements are false."

But Lutfi has it backwards. Under California law, it is the obligation of the Plaintiff, not the Defendant, to "specifically identify" the alleged libels. Gilbert v. Sykes, supra; Silicon Knights, Inc. v. Crystal Dynamics, Inc. supra, Jacobson v Schwarzenegger, supra. This is fundamental since it is Lutfi's burden to prove falsity by clear and convincing evidence.

Lutfi argues that Lynne "had three and a half years to investigate and conduct discovery to prepare for trial." Supp. Brief 1:22-23. Yet, Lutfi totally ignores that fact that Lynne's counsel did indeed question Lutfi at his deposition on the Previously Identified Alleged Defamatory Statements, because those were the only alleged defamatory statements he had identified in the FAC, as required by California law. See Reply Declaration of Stephen F. Rohde, ¶2 and that Lynne also propounded a set of Requests for Admission and Form Interrogatories, to which Luti responded on February 14, 2011, in which she specifically questioned Lutfi only about the Previously Identified Alleged Defamatory Statements, because again those were

the <u>only</u> alleged defamatory statements he had identified in the FAC, as required by California law. See Reply Declaration of Stephen F. Rohde, ¶2.

Lutfi's Supp. Brief does not deny that throughout the 3 ½ years of this litigation, including all motion practice, an anti-SLAPP Motion, an appeal to the Court of Appeal on the anti-SLAPP motion, all discovery, including an extensive deposition of Lutfi, and Plaintiff's draft Jury Instructions submitted in December, 2011 in advance of the initial Trial date last January, the only libelous or defamatory statements alleges by Plaintiff were the **Previously Identified Alleged Defamatory**Statements listed above.

Lutfi likewise is oblivious of the fact that his scattergun approach would violate Lynne's right to Due Process and Fair Notice, especially in light of the fact that since Plaintiff is a limited public figure, this case is subject to all of the protections of the First Amendment, at the core of which is the fundamental constitutional right to be on notice of each and every alleged defamatory statement and to have a full and fair opportunity to prepare a complete defense to each and every alleged defamatory statement. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-6 (1964).

For each of these reasons, the Court should reiterate its ruling and enter an Order prohibiting Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel from referring to, questioning about, commenting upon, attempting to suggest or attempting to introduce testimony or evidence concerning any alleged defamatory statements as a basis for the First, Second and Fourth Causes of Action, except Previously Identified Alleged Defamatory Statements.

Dated: October 9, 2012

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